The Nobel Prize

IS SOVEREIGN GUARANTEE REQUIRED FOR PROJECTS BACKED BY UKEF’S BUYER CREDIT GUARANTEE?



August 20, 2025

A.    Government Guarantees

Government guarantees are formal commitments—often through contracts or comfort letters—where the government agrees to fulfill certain obligations or cover defined losses under specific conditions. Government guarantees are a sovereign obligation under a binding or potentially binding2 written document (such as a contract or comfort letter) to satisfy certain obligations of an underlying contract, or to protect the beneficiary from defined losses if specified conditions occur.

These guarantees:

  • Enhance project viability by making them more attractive and financeable for private investors.
  • Mitigate risks that investors cannot control or are unwilling to bear.
  • Improve creditworthiness of projects, even in developed countries, helping to mobilize private capital.
  • Reduce financing costs, which can lead to lower service costs for consumers.

B.    Types of Government Guarantees

1.     Performance Guarantee

Government guarantees are nearly always structured as performance guarantees, to reinforce certain government undertakings or cover the risk of a guaranteed government counterparty’s failure to perform targeted or specific risks or obligations linked to underlying PPP contracts or concessions. With this type of guarantee, the government commits to making the contractual obligor (for example, subnational government or SOE) fulfill its obligations under specific project agreements, such as concession agreements, supply agreements, or output purchase agreements. The primary focus is on performance, although it may include financial implications to eventually make the beneficiary whole. Generally, payment guarantees are financial commitments that require the guarantor to make a payment on behalf of the guaranteed entity, based on the terms outlined in the original concession agreement, in the event of payment default by the primary obligor.

2.     Financial Guarantee

Financial or credit guarantees are usually unconditional agreements to service debt obligations of the borrower in case of default. the government is “stepping into” the underlying loan agreements to make debt-service payments on behalf of the borrower, such as the subnational government or SOE, often regardless of the cause of default. Financial guarantees are rarely used in infrastructure PPPs because they may facilitate unbalanced risk allocations that place all risk with the government, and they are not linked to any performance indicators for the private sector. As a result, the government can be liable for a whole host of risks ranging from natural disasters and other force majeure events, to defaults by the private sector such as construction contractors. This type of guarantee may provide the wrong incentives for the private sector because it relieves the debt-repayment pressure from the

sponsors or contractors, especially if the project is not carefully planned and designed. Moreover, governments are often left with no time to remediate the situation through internal coordination or renegotiations, and are instead obligated to make immediate payment.

C.    Other forms of Government Support Mechanisms

 

Comfort letters, letters of intent, keep-well agreements, letters of support are not intended to be legally enforceable. Governments can support projects through various mechanisms beyond guarantees, including:

  • Subsidies: Capital grants, financial viability support (upfront or ongoing), and in-kind grants.
  • Capital Injections: Direct funding or equity investments to reduce project costs.
  • Strategic Selection: The choice of support depends on the government's goals or the market failure being addressed.

Revenue and Demand Risk Guarantees

 

The most common supports are land acquisition and resettlement costs, minimum demand and revenue guarantees, payment obligation guarantees, currency inconvertibility and transferability risk guarantees, and credit guarantees. Other forms of support include viability gap funding and grant funding at financial close to be used during construction. A government guarantee of a certain minimum level of usage, or of a minimum level of revenues, may be necessary for the project to obtain financing, because lenders tend to shy away from greenfield demand risk. While an availability payment is not technically a guarantee, it often functions in a similar manner to reduce a specific risk—in this case, demand risk. However, because the risks that are addressed by the guarantee are largely beyond the government’s control, governments should provide such guarantees with extra caution. For example, if demand projections are not sufficient to attract investment without a guarantee, governments should first determine whether there is a strong enough economic case to move forward with the project before resorting to providing a revenue guarantee, indemnity agreements, government undertakings, and guarantee agreements.

 

D.    Is Government Guarantees required for a project backed by UKEF’s Buyer Credit Guarantee?

Yes and no. 

For a project backed by UKEF’s Buyer Credit Guarantee:

·       Government Financial Guarantee: Usually not required. UKEF already provides the financial guarantee to the lenders on behalf of the exporter, so an additional sovereign financial guarantee would duplicate coverage. Financial guarantee depends on the borrower's risk profile and the country's creditworthiness. UKEF may require financial guarantee from high-risk markets (where UKEF perceives elevated political or credit risk). However, it should be noted that none of the official sources explicitly stated that sovereign financial guarantee is adopted in the projects sited at Annex 1.

·       Government Performance Guarantee: Commonly required. UKEF wants assurance that the government (or relevant public entity) will perform its obligations under the project agreements (e.g., concession contract, availability payments, demand support, land acquisition, permits). This ensures that the borrower/exporter is not exposed to non-performance by the public counterparty. 

Reference: 

https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/sites/ppp.worldbank.org/files/2020-02/Government-Guarantees%20for%20Mobilizing%20Private%20Investment%20in%20Infrastructure.pdf

https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/468626/ewp-564-risk-mitigation-sovereign-guarantees-ppps.pdf

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68777b910263c35f52e4dc3e/UKEF_Annual_Report___Accounts_2024-25.pdf

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Annex 1. UKEF’s Buyer Credit Guaranteed Projects

 

Project Name / Type

Country

Sector

Buyer Type

Project Description

UKEF Support

UK Involvement

1

Ankara–Izmir High-Speed Railway

Turkey

Transport

Turkish Government

503 km high-speed electric railway

£1.7 billion Buyer Credit Facility

UK suppliers for rail infrastructure

2

Yerköy–Kayseri Electric Railway

Turkey

Transport

Turkish Ministry of Transport

140 km low-carbon electric railway

€1.027 billion loan guaranteed by UKEF and ECAs

UK firms supplying steel, pipes, equipment

3

Morava Corridor Motorway

Serbia

Transport

Serbian Ministry of Finance

5G-ready motorway with flood defense system

€430 million Buyer Credit Facility

UK goods/services via Bechtel-ENKA JV

4

Zanzibar Infrastructure Projects

Tanzania

Airports & Roads

Ministry of Finance (non-sovereign structure)

Pemba Airport expansion and 103 km of road upgrades

€422 million via Citi & Deutsche Bank with UKEF guarantees

UK firms awarded £100+ million in contracts

5

Egyptian Railway Modernization

Egypt

Transport

Egyptian National Railway Authority (ENR) - State-owned

Modernization of national railway infrastructure

£1.7 Billion Buyer Credit Guarantee

State entity purchasing critical infrastructure

UK content - Rolling stock, engineering works, operation and maintenance

6

Kotoka Airport Expansion

Ghana

Transport / Aviation

Ghana Airports Company Ltd (GACL) - State-owned

Expansion of Kotoka International Airport

£120 Million Buyer Credit Guarantee

State-owned company undertaking national infrastructure

7

Six Flags Qiddiya Theme Park

Saudi Arabia

Leisure / Tourism

PIF & Bouygues Batiment

Theme park in the outskirts of Riyadh

Islamic Finance £531.3 million

UK suppliers involved in construction

 

 

SUB-SOVEREIGN DEBT

 


 

August 13, 2025

 

In Recent Experiences

1.    Domestic bond through the Stock Exchange (June 2024): The Municipality of Ulaanbaatar (MUB) sold a domestic bond[1] of MNT 500 billion with coupon 12-14%, tenor 24-36 months on Mongolian Stock Exchange in June 2024. The bond would be invested in the following projects: 

·      Up to MNT 300 billion to Power Plant Buuruljuut,

·      Up to MNT 150 billion for the UB city road enhancement and renewal,

·      Up to MNT 50 billion to Tuul 1 wastewater treatment collector and antiflood structure.

For issuing domestic bond, sovereign guarantee is not required by the Law on the Debt Management.

2.    Foreign bond (December 2024): The Municipality of Ulaanbaatar (MUB) issued a bond of USD 500 million at an interest rate of 7.75 percent, a term of 2.75 years in the international market in December, 2024 with a sovereign guarantee required by the Law on Debt Management. In accordance with Resolution No. 17 of the State Great Hural dated January 17, 2024, and Government Resolution No. 265 dated June 6, 2024, the Government provided a guarantee for financing the “Selbe Sub-Center Housing Development Project” through the issuance of a foreign bond by MUB.

It should be noted that the MUB cannot issue securities directly in the foreign market and is subject to mandatory conditions for obtaining a guarantee from the Government.

3.    Bond issued in domestic OTC market[2]: In January 2025, the MUB sold a bond (most likely MNT denominated bond but not confirmed) in domestic OTC market to IFC. IFC is engaging in a privately placed unsecured bond of up to US$90 million. The investment entails (i) an own account IFC investment of up to US$65 million and (ii) an investment by IFC-Canada Blended Climate Finance Program (BCFP) of up to US$25 million. The proceeds of the financing will be used for the procurement by the MUB of the supply and construction for the 50MW/200MWh Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) project.

 

4.    Municipal Loans: There is no specific regulation for municipal loans in the Law on Debt Management, meaning the MUB cannot directly obtain loans from Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). Instead, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) acts as the borrower on behalf of the state, and the funds are then allocated to municipal projects.

 

It is important to note that any foreign loan agreement must be approved by the Parliament of Mongolia. A specific example of this is the Ulaanbaatar Green Affordable Housing and Resilient Urban Renewal Sector Project, where the MoF acted as the borrower for the Ordinary Operations Loan Agreement. A specific example of this is the Ulaanbaatar Green Affordable Housing and Resilient Urban Renewal Sector Project[3], where the MoF acted as the borrower for the Ordinary Operations Loan Agreement. In this case, the MUB served as the executing agency, responsible for carrying out the project in accordance with the Project Agreement.

This particular loan agreement was approved by the Parliament in September 2019[4]. The process for securing foreign loan arrangements requires a considerable amount of time, involving extensive due diligence and negotiations. As outlined in Article 7.1.5 of the Law on Debt Management, such foreign loan agreements must be approved by the Parliament of Mongolia.

Key Takeaways

·      Municipal loans for Ulaanbaatar are possible, but only through the Ministry of Finance.

·      Ulaanbaatar cannot independently contract foreign loans under current law.

·      On-lending and national budget allocations are the main funding channels.

·      Legal reforms would be needed for direct municipal borrowing.

Affordability


a)  The Concept of the Affordable Fare

Affordability is the important topic concerning equality and poor people. According to the World Bank study[1], the “Armstrong-Wright maxim” has often been interpreted as a reasonable rule for determining the level of a politically administered price. In that rule, more than 10 percent of households spend more than 15 percent of household incomes on work journeys can be regarded as discriminatory. 

According to the survey[2] undertaken by the International Association of Public Transport (UITP), it shows households generally spend 10-20% of their disposable income on mobility (Figure 2.). 

Figure 2. Overview of mobility budget expenses over total household expenses, sample 103 (UITP Social Fares Survey 2022)

Source: UITP

 

ADB’s guidelines[3] emphasizes the affordability by indicating that all in society should have an access to urban transport system which meets their mobility demand. 

 

b)    Affordability at fare MNT 5000 and its share of total income of individuals or households

 

Based on the average monthly salary in UB

 

According to recent statistics, the average monthly salary in UB represents MNT 2,621,900 (≈ USD 728 as of Q1‑2025).  If we expect 2 rides per day that a person takes to and from work, this accounts for 8.8 percent of his/her daily income (Table 1.). 

 

In terms of greater equality, we may examine the lower income group, specifically workers with elementary occupation. Average monthly salary for these individuals is MNT 1,798,200 as of Q1-2025. This translates to percentage income of 12.8% (Table 1.).

Table 1. Percentage of Daily Income at Fare Of 5000 MNT

Indicator

UB City Average Salary

Elementary Occupation’s Average Salary

Monthly Average Salary (Q1 2025)

2.6 million MNT

1.8 million MNT

Daily income (working 22 days)

119,177 MNT/day

81,736 MNT/day

2 rides/day at 5,240 MNT = 10,480 MNT/day

8.8% of income

12.8% of income

 

In the Figure 3., it illustrates percentage of daily income for individuals for each of fare points between MNT 2500 and MNT 6000. For workers with elementary occupation, fare at MNT 6000 accounts for 14.7% of daily income which may be a high figure. Setting the fare at 5,000 MNT would indeed represent a meaningful share of daily income, though still within affordability boundaries defined in the World Bank Study. It should be noted that this estimation does not take into account the lower income group. 

 

Figure 3. Percentage of Daily Income 

(2 Rides/Day at Fare 5000), By Monthly Average Salary in UB and Monthly Average Salary in Elementary Occupation

Source: National Statistics Office, Author’s Estimation

 

 

Figure 4. Percentage of households, by income level, 1000 MNT 

 

Source: National Statistics Office

 

Based on the household’s monthly income in UB

 

If we take account household income data of 475k rather than individual’s salary, lower (first) decile or 10 percent of total household earns revenue of less than MNT 1100,000 per month. Specifically as presented data in the Figure 4., 4.9% of total household generates monthly income of MNT 700,000 or less than MNT 700,000 and 3.7% of total household generates revenue between MNT 700,001 and MNT 900,000. It accounts for 32.9% of daily income for the poorest group, which might be seen the profound burden on their budget. 

 

4. Further Actions on the Fare Determination

 

In the FS, a fare of MNT 1250 is determined based on the Survey Result[4] and Affordability-Based Pricing model. In this study, however, a higher fare of MNT 5000, which maximizes daily revenue, is proposed under the same pricing model. Using household data, it is evident that this fare level would impose a significant burden on lower-income deciles, particularly the bottom 10%, raising concerns about equity and access. Therefore, fare determination should be further examined to ensure financial sustainability while simultaneously maintaining affordability for all passenger, using the following approaches:

 

·       Cost-Recovery Pricing (Cost-Plus): Fare = (O&M cost + margin) / forecasted ridership

·       Political Pricing: A lower fare is set based on social or political objectives, with the government providing operational subsidies to cover the gap between revenue and actual cost



[1] https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/38cf632c-5bb6-5689-8eb4-b6b3be7442e9/content

[2] https://cms.uitp.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250505_Fare-Affordability_Policy-Brief_WEB.pdf

[3] https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/855221/strategy-2030-transport-sector-directional-guide.pdf

[4] A Survey of 15,000 Households to Develop an Origin-Destination (OD) Matrix for Citizen Travel Movements, MMCG, 2022 and PMC Study Team