Oliver Hart was born in London in 1948 and educated at University College School (an institution whose name suggests that it is confused about its identity). He then studied mathematics at Cambridge before turning to economics at a time when a number of others were doing the same. The transition took place at Warwick University, where Hart spent one year learning basic economics and the second doing a master’s degree. From there he went to Princeton (after some useful lobbying from one of his Warwick professors, John Williamson), where he did a PhD. At Princeton he met his future wife, Rita Goldberg, with whom he later had two sons, Daniel and Benjamin. He also learned at Princeton that mathematical economics was not the only economics field to which mathematics could be applied; there was something called economic theory. Michael Rothschild, who had recently moved from Harvard to be a professor at Princeton, was a crucial influence here.
While at Princeton, Hart became interested in the idea of a stock market economy and more generally incomplete markets. At some point he realized that standard (constrained) optimality arguments do not apply to incomplete market economies with more than one good or more than two periods. Further exploration led him to construct examples where multiple equilibria can be Pareto ranked; where an ex ante redistribution of wealth can lead to a Pareto improvement; where an equilibrium does not exist; and where adding a market can make everyone worse off.
Hart’s thesis and resulting paper, published in JET in 1975, were well enough received to land him his first job at Essex University in 1974 and his second job at Cambridge in 1975. It is fair to say, however, that since economic theorists were engaged in other pursuits at the time, e.g., asymmetric information (and, in Europe, disequilibrium theory), the paper disappeared from people’s radar screens for a while. It was “rediscovered” in the mid-80s when general equilibrium theorists started working systematically on incomplete markets. More recently, perhaps because of the financial crisis, macroeconomists have become interested in the kinds of pecuniary externalities that are at the heart of Hart’s paper.
Although the practical importance of the inefficiencies identified in the 1975 paper can be questioned, the fact that the paper is still being talked about more than forty years after it was written is a pleasant surprise and not something that Hart would have predicted.